programme

Game Theory 2

Home/ Game Theory 2
Course TypeCourse CodeNo. Of Credits
Discipline ElectiveSLS2EC2304

Semester and Year Offered:

Course Coordinator and Team: Jyotirmoy Bhattacharya

Email of course coordinator: jyotirmoy[at]aud[dot]ac[dot]in

Pre-requisites:

Very good grasp of game theory and formal proofs at the level of 'Game Theory I'. Knowledge of linear algebra and probability at the B.A. (Hons.) Economics level.

Aim: This is an advanced course for students who aim to specialize in economic theory. It seeks to prepare students to approach current research literature in game theory by familiarising them with currently active applications as well as new innovations within the core of game theory itself.

Course Outcomes:

At the successful completion of this course students will:

  1. Understand current scholarship in at least two areas of research in game theory at a level sufficient to formulate a plan for Ph.D. level research of their own.
  2. Acquire a level of mathematical sophistication suitable for starting research in economic theory.

Brief description of modules/ Main modules:

The topics mentioned below are indicative and may change from year to year depending on the interests of the instructor and developments within the field:

  1. Mechanism design: review of Arrow's impossibility theorem, dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation, optimal mechanisms, simple applications to auctions.
  2. Epistemic game theory: Hierarchies of knowledge and beliefs, common knowledge, Harsanyi's conception of types, epistemic conditions for different solution concepts.
  3. Learning in games: Learning dynamics under fictitious play, regret matching and Bayesian learning.

Assessment Details with weights

ComponentWeight

Class test: best two of three

In-class examinations with problems, proofs and reflective questions covered in the first, second and third month of the course respectively.

30% each

End-Semester exam

In-class examinations with problems, proofs and reflective questions covering the entire course.

40%

Reading List:

  • Osborne, Martin J. and Ariel Rubinstein (1994). A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press.
  • Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991). Game Theory, MIT Press.
  • Hart, Sergiu and Andreu Mas-Colell (2013). Simple Adaptive Strategies, World Scientific.
  • Mas-Colell, Andreu, Whinston, Michael D. and Jerry R. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press.
  • Maschler, Michael, Solan, Eilon and Zamir, Shmuel (2013). Game Theory, Cambridge University Press.
  • Milgrom, Paul (2004). Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press.
  • Young, Peyton H. (2004). Strategic Learning and Its Limits, Oxford University Press.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE:

  • Current and classic papers references to which will be provided by the instructor.